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Abstract	
	
Ensuring	fiscal	discipline	of	debtor	governments	 in	order	to	reduce	default	risk	
has	been	a	key	concern	for	foreign	creditors	both	today	and	in	the	past.	This	paper	
discusses	 the	 functioning	 and	 evolution	 of	 one	 particular	 method	 of	 securing	
payment	 from	 a	 historical	 perspective:	 lending	 conditionality	 via	 international	
financial	control.	By	focusing	on	the	major	defaulters	in	the	European	periphery	
during	1870-1914,	the	paper	maintains	that	the	success	of	lending	conditionality	
in	 the	 form	 international	 financial	 control	 was	 mainly	 determined	 by	 the	
willingness	and	ability	of	the	debtor	governments	to	comply	with	the	advice	of	
their	foreign	creditors	-or	in	the	modern	language	by	the	“country	ownership”	of	
fiscal	 programs.	 Limited	 fiscal	 capacity	 created	 incentives	 for	 the	 debtor	
governments	to	cooperate	with	foreign	creditors	but	this	willingness	to	cooperate	
was	constrained	by	the	political	representation	of	taxpayers,	since	foreign	control	
usually	implied	heavy	taxation	of	key	sectors.	The	findings	of	the	paper	suggest	
that,	 similar	 to	 today’s	 Eurozone	 fiscal	 discipline	 programs,	 the	 success	 of	
international	financial	control	over	government	finances	was	dependent	upon	the	
political	economy	of	fiscal	and	political	institutions	of	debtors.	
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1. Introduction		Following	the	recent	European	sovereign	debt	crisis,	 introducing	and	enforcing	effective	fiscal	rules	have	increasingly	been	put	forward	as	a	remedy	for	ensuring	fiscal	 discipline	 among	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Eurozone.	 The	 implications	 of	different	 policy	 instruments,	 especially	 as	 regards	 to	 political	 feasibility	 and	credibility,	 have	 been	 extensively	 debated	 amongst	 the	 economists	 and	policymakers.	 In	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 future	 crises	 strict	 policy	conditionality,	mostly	 in	 the	 form	of	adopting	a	credible	austerity	package,	has	been	 put	 forward	 as	 a	 major	 requirement	 for	 financial	 assistance	 through	European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 and	 Economic	 Adjustment	 Programme.	 At	 the	extreme	 end,	 several	 proposals	 include	 establishment	 of	 independent	 fiscal	agencies	 or	 fiscal	 councils	 in	 debtor	 states	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 deficit	 bias	 of	Eurozone	countries	(Castellani	and	Debrun,	2005;	Featherstone,	2015;	Grauwe,	2011;	Ioannidis,	2015;	Hagemann,	2011;	Kaplanoglou	and	Rapanos,	2013).	This	 paper	 explores	 how	European	 financial	markets	 dealt	with	 similar	problems	 in	 the	 past,	 and	 discusses	 the	 functioning	 and	 evolution	 of	 lending	conditionality	and	fiscal	rules	during	1870-1914,	when	global	capital	flows	were	at	 its	peak.	One	of	 the	consequences	of	 the	global	expansion	of	capital	markets	during	 this	 period	 was	 the	 rapid	 increase	 in	 sovereign	 debt	 from	 surplus	 to	deficit	countries,	which	eventually	led	to	defaults	on	foreign	obligations	in	many	debtor	states	(Suter,	1990).1	As	a	response	to	defaults,	foreign	bondholders	and	their	 respective	 governments	 adopted	 several	 coercive	 tools,	 which	 included	seizing	 the	 assets	 of	 debtor	 countries	 through	military	 intervention,	 imposing	trade	restrictions	and	preventing	access	to	future	credit.	More	refined	solutions	sought	 to	reduce	default	risk	 through	 issue	of	 loans,	which	were	contracted	on	strict	 conditions.	 These	 different	 enforcement	 mechanisms,	 repayment	incentives	 and	 lending	 strategies	 constituted	 the	 pillars	 of	 global	 governing	sovereign	debt	before	1914.			The	 focus	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 particular	 type	 of	lending	 conditionality	 via	 international	 financial	 control	 (IFC),	 which	 was	introduced	 following	defaults	 in	a	number	of	heavily	 indebted	 countries	 in	 the	European	periphery	from	1860s	to	the	First	World	War.	 IFC	meant	a	partial	or	full	 loss	 of	 sovereignty	 for	 debtor	 countries,	 as	 it	 would	 assume	 the	 right	 of	administering	 certain	 revenues	 of	 defaulting	 states	 on	 behalf	 of	 creditors.	 The	first	 known	 example	was	 established	 in	 Tunisia	 in	 1869.	 Several	 others	 in	 the	region,	 including	 Egypt,	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 Serbia,	 Greece	 and	 Bulgaria,	
																																																								1	Including	 Tunisia	 (1868),	 Ottoman	 Empire	 (1876),	 Egypt	 (1876),	 Spain	 (1877),	 Argentina	(1890),	Portugal	(1892),	Greece	(1893),	Serbia	(1895)	and	Brazil	(1898).	
	 2	
followed	this	suit.2	In	 the	case	of	Egypt,	 the	establishment	of	 IFC	 led	to	a	direct	takeover	of	the	state	finances	and	complete	loss	of	political	sovereignty,	whereas	in	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 IFC	 took	 charge	 of	 several	 revenue	 sources	 and	administered	them	on	behalf	of	foreign	creditors.	These	more	direct	methods	of	control	 emerged	 during	 1875-76	 had	 some	 key	 differences	 from	 the	 later	episode	of	 IFC,	which	 appeared	 in	 Serbia	 and	Greece	during	1895-98.	 In	 these	two	cases	the	administrative	structure	of	IFC	was	more	refined,	the	extent	of	its	control	was	more	 limited,	and	 it	mainly	 focused	on	measures	concerning	 fiscal	and	monetary	 discipline.	 	 Having	 been	 administered	 by	 the	 representatives	 of	foreign	 creditors	 and	 their	 respective	 governments,	 these	 multilateral	enforcement	 bodies	 introduced	 a	 different	 set	 of	 fiscal	 and	monetary	 rules	 in	each	 country	 in	 return	 for	 reinstating	 credibility	 and	 restoring	 access	 to	 the	international	financial	markets.		In	 this	 context,	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	document	the	evolution	of	IFC	in	the	European	periphery,	and	discuss	the	most	prominent	 cases	 in	 the	 region:	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 Egypt,	 Greece	 and	 Serbia.	Section	 3	 provides	 comparative	 evidence	 on	 the	 performance	 of	 IFC	 in	administering	 the	 revenues	 of	 debtor	 states	 and	 it	 impact	 on	 the	 credibility	 of	the	 defaulting	 sovereigns.	 Section	 4	 elaborates	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 “ownership”	 of	policy	advice	in	pre-1914	context.	I	suggest	that	political	resistance	to	IFC	and	its	operations	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 sign	 lack	 of	 ownership	 and	 I	 explore	 the	relationship	 between	 political	 regime	 types,	 debtor	 governments	 and	 IFC	 in	search	 for	 some	 explanations.	 In	 conclusion,	 I	 highlight	 that	 the	 success	 of	lending	conditionality	in	the	form	IFC	was	mainly	determined	by	the	willingness	and	ability	of	the	debtor	governments	to	comply	with	the	advice	of	their	foreign	creditors.	 I	 conclude	 that	 this	 cooperative	 attitude	 with	 foreign	 advice	 and	control	was	mainly	driven	by	the	lack	of	political	representation	of	taxpayers.		
2. Conditionality	and	international	financial	control	before	
1914:	a	review		Sovereign	debt	contracts	are	unique	as	they	are	concluded	between	parties,	who	do	 not	 enjoy	 the	 same	 degree	 of	 legal	 immunity.	 Despite	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	enforcement	by	a	third-party	in	the	case	of	a	default,	debtor	countries	still	repay	their	debts	because	of	the	costs	of	default,	which	are	positively	correlated	with	the	 ability	 of	 creditors	 to	 impose	 effective	 sanctions	 (Bulow	 and	Rogoff,	 1988;	Kelly,	1998).	Historically,	in	the	context	of	the	pre-1914	sovereign	debt	market,																																																									2	For	a	comparative	history	of	sovereign	debt	and	international	financial	control	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	Egypt,	Greece,	and	Serbia	see	Tuncer	(2015).	For	Bulgaria	see	Avramov	(2003)	and	Tooze	and	Ivanov	(2011).	For	Tunisia	see	Zourai	(1998).
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creditors	 employed	 a	 combination	of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 forms	of	 enforcement	ranging	 from	 military	 interventions	 to	 preventing	 access	 to	 future	 credit.3	Creditors	also	sought	ways	to	strengthen	the	terms	of	sovereign	debt	contracts	to	claim	their	debts	on	legal	grounds.	Arbitration,	renegotiation,	sinking	fund	and	collective	action	clauses	were	 incorporated	 into	agreements	 in	order	 to	reduce	the	 risk	 of	 default	 and	 create	 incentives	 for	 repayment	 (Wynne,	 1951;	 Choi,	Gulati	 and	 Posner,	 2012:	 140-148).	 Moreover,	 bondholder	 protective	organisations,	such	as	British	Corporation	of	Foreign	Bondholders	(1868),	were	established	 to	 provide	 market-based	 solutions	 to	 the	 debt	 renegotiations	 and	collective	 action	 of	 bondholders	 (Mauro	 and	 Yafeh,	 2003;	 Esteves,	 2013).4	Although	the	term	conditionality	has	frequently	been	used	in	the	context	of	IMF	lending,	it	can	be	interpreted	yet	another	mechanism	to	reduce	the	risk	of	future	default,	since	it	implies	that	if	a	country	takes	certain	specified	actions,	continued	financing	 will	 be	 provided	 (Drazen,	 2002;	 Bird,	 2003;	 Dreher,	 2009,	 James,	2003).	In	this	broad	sense	of	the	term,	IFC	or	foreign	control	over	the	revenues	of	 the	 defaulting	 states	was	 a	 direct	 form	 of	 conditionality	 as	 it	 increased	 the	likelihood	 of	 future	 repayment	 of	 debts	 for	 creditors,	 and	 it	 implied	 a	 set	 of	conditions	 for	 borrower	 countries	 to	 access	 international	 financial	 markets	 in	the	long	term.		IFC	in	the	European	periphery	was	organised	as	revenue	collecting	agents	because	 of	 a	 particular	 feature	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 contracts.	 In	 pre-1914	sovereign	 debt	 market,	 most	 of	 the	 bond	 issues	 of	 peripheral	 countries	 were	implemented	on	the	basis	of	a	security,	which	could	be	placed	beyond	the	reach	of	 the	borrowing	country	and	be	used	only	 for	 the	service	of	 the	relevant	 loan.	These	pledges	could	be	very	general	and	suggest	that	the	bond	repayment	was	secured	 “upon	 the	entire	 revenue	and	assets	 and	domains	of	 the	borrower”	or	they	could	be	as	specific	as	particular	real	estates	of	a	sovereign	or	some	other	tangible	 assets	 (Wynne,	 1951:	 82).	 More	 frequently,	 bonds	 before	 1914	 were	secured	with	 future	revenues	 from	certain	resources	of	the	borrower	sovereign.	Depositing	assets	or	assigning	 securities	meant	 that,	 in	 theory,	 in	 the	 case	of	 a	default	it	would	be	relatively	easy	to	seize	these	assets	or	demand	hypothecated	revenues	in	order	to	compensate	the	loss	of	creditors.		In	many	instances	these	future	revenues	could	come	from	governmental	monopolies	or	other	public	services,	commercial	enterprises	such	as	mines,	they	could	be	from	future	tax	revenues.	In	majority	of	cases,	indirect	taxes	and	custom																																																									3	For	 the	 use	 of	 military	 intervention	 until	 the	 Second	 Hague	 conference	 in	 1907	 see	 Adams	(1890),	 Borchard	 (1925:	 314);	 Finnemore	 (2003).	 For	 trade	 sanctions	 see	 Rose	 (2005).	 For	preventing	 access	 to	 future	 credit	 see	 Eaton	 and	 Gersovitz	 (1981),	 Bulow	 and	 Rogoff	 (1989),	Panizza,	Sturzenegger	and	Zettelmeyer	(2009).	For	a	general	discussion	on	sanctions	and	costs	of	default	 see	 Borchard	 (1951),	 Kaletsky	 (1985),	 Mitchener	 and	 Weidenmier	 (2010),	 Waibel	(2011).		4	More	 recent	 contributions	point	out	 that	CFB’s	 significance	 in	 the	pre-1914	sovereign	debt	 is	over-rated;	instead	it	was	the	leading	investment	banks	and	intermediaries	who	would	give	the	right	signals	to	the	creditors.	Flandreau	and	Flores	(2009),	Flandreau	(2013).	
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revenues	 from	 specified	 ports	 or	 products	 of	 the	 borrower	 were	 the	 most	popular	choice,	as	they	constituted	a	stable	source	of	revenue	(Hyde,	1922:	534-535;	Wynne,	1951:	82-91).	Although	most	of	these	pledges	were	quite	valuable,	creditors	were	aware	that	the	securing	future	revenues	for	the	payment	of	a	loan	did	not	mean	that	sovereign	borrower	would	in	fact	utilize	them	for	this	purpose	or	manage	them	in	a	way	to	prove	to	the	 lender	beneficial.	 In	order	to	address	this	 problem,	 in	 certain	 cases	 lending	 would	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 condition	 of	establishing	 “creditor	 committees”,	which	were	 responsible	of	monitoring	how	the	 funds	 would	 be	 spent.	 An	 earlier	 example	 of	 this	 was	 the	 guaranteed	Ottoman	 loan	of	 1855,	which	was	 granted	by	 the	Great	Powers	 to	 support	 the	Ottoman	Empire	against	Russia	during	the	Crimean	War	of	1854.	One	condition	of	the	guaranty	was	to	use	the	proceedings	entirely	for	war	purposes	and	British	and	French	representatives	were	assigned	to	monitor	the	spending	of	funds.	The	role	of	these	commissioners,	who	were	sent	to	Istanbul	despite	the	opposition	of	the	 Ottoman	 government,	 was	 to	 verify	 the	 treasury	 accounts	 and	 ensure	 the	funds	were	 in	 fact	spent	 in	support	of	 the	army.	A	problem	with	these	types	of	arrangements	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 if	 the	 debtor	 state	 did	 not	 comply	with	 the	 lending	 conditions.	 In	 fact,	 in	 this	 specific	 example,	 due	 to	 the	opposition	of	the	Porte	to	the	arrangement,	the	work	of	the	foreign	commission	started	 only	 in	 January	 1856,	 after	 several	 army	 contracts	 had	 already	 been	signed	in	order	to	evade	its	control.	By	September	1856	all	funds	were	spent	and	the	 commission	 finished	 its	work.	5	Similar	problems	emerged	especially	 in	 the	case	 of	 a	 default,	 as	 there	 was	 no	 automatic	 mechanism	 to	 transfer	 the	hypothecated	 revenues	 of	 defaulted	 governments	 to	 the	 creditors.	 As	 early	 as	1860s,	well	before	any	of	the	defaults	took	place	in	the	European	periphery,	in	an	article	 published	 in	 the	 Economist,	 contemporary	 observers	 highlighted	 the	potential	 limitations	of	 the	existing	system	of	sovereign	 lending	on	the	basis	of	guarantees:		“Loans	 made	 on	 specific	 securities	 to	 a	 foreign	 state	 are	 never	 the	most	satisfactory	sort	of	loans	and	this	for	a	single	plain	reason:	-the	property	which	 is	pledged	 is	almost	wholly	under	 the	control	of	 the	indebted	 state,	 and	 if	 that	 state	 is	 inclined	 to	 repudiate,	 there	 is	 a	necessary	 difficulty	 in	 getting	 at	 the	 security.	 Such	 is	 especially	 the	case	if	the	security	consists,	as	is	ordinarily	the	case,	of	a	certain	part	of	the	state	revenue.	First	it	depends	on	the	state	itself	whether	that	revenue	is	ever	collected;	and	secondly,	it	depends	on	the	state	itself	whether	 that	 revenue	shall	be	paid	 to	creditor…	 It	 is	quite	 true	 that	the	creditors	may	apply	to	their	own	government	for	protection.	If	the	English,	for	example,	lend	their	money	to	Turkey	upon	certain	specific																																																									5	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	pre-1914	guaranteed	bonds	including	the	Ottoman	loan	of	1855	see	Esteves	and	Tuncer	(2014).	
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securities,	 they	 may	 apply	 more	 or	 less	 successfully	 to	 their	 own	government	to	obtain	for	them	the	annual	income	of	those	securities.	But	if	the	government	consent	to	give	its	aid,	the	probably	result	will	be	a	political	complication	of	which	no	one	can	foresee	the	end:	and	this	is	the	best	event,	for	if	the	government	decline	to	aid	by	force	the	claims	of	 its	 subject,	we	may	be	sure	 they	will	 receive	nothing	 from	their	repudiating	debtor”.6		 This	 article,	 written	 in	 fact	 with	 reference	 to	 a	 new	 bond	 issue	 of	 the	Ottoman	Empire,	predicted	almost	accurately	 the	sequence	of	potential	pitfalls,	when	the	bonds	were	secured	with	specific	revenues.	To	put	 it	 in	other	words,	the	pledged	revenue	could	become	a	security	in	the	hands	of	creditors	if	it	could	indeed	 be	 removed	 from	 the	 defaulting	 sovereign	 and	 transferred	 to	 the	creditors.	However,	 in	practice	this	was	not	possible	due	to	the	nature	of	these	revenue	 sources.	 Therefore,	 the	 proposed	 solution	was	 to	 use	 an	 organisation	independent	 from	 the	 defaulting	 sovereign	 to	 administer	 and	 control	 the	pledged	 revenues	 on	 behalf	 of	 bondholders,	 and	 to	 transfer	 the	 receipts	 from	these	 sources	 to	 all	 creditors	 for	 the	 unpaid	 debt	 (Borchard	 1951:	 91;	 Hyde,	1922:	 535).	 I	 name	 these	ad	hoc	 foreign	 revenue	 administration	 agents,	which	appeared	 in	 Egypt	 (1876),	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 (1881),	 Serbia	 (1895)	 and	Greece	(1898),	collectively	as	IFC.	The	historical	 literature	 on	 IFC	 is	 limited	 to	 a	 few	documentary	 studies	published	by	contemporaries	to	outline	their	major	functions	and	administrative	structure	(Andreades,	1925;	Borchard,	1951;	Deville,	1912;	Wynne,	1951).	One	line	of	literature	treats	IFC	on	legal	grounds	and	discusses	them	in	the	context	of	international	 law	(Borchard,	1951:	93;	Waibel,	2011:	42).	Recent	contributions	in	 economic	 history	 literature	 argue	 that	 IFC	 was	 a	 form	 of	 “supersanction”	which	helped	 to	enforce	 sovereign	debt	 contracts,	 and	 that	 they	were	effective	tools	to	reduce	the	cost	of	borrowing	for	the	defaulting	countries	(Mitchener	and	Weidenmier,	 2010).	 As	 oppose	 to	 economic	 and	 legal	 literature	 on	 the	 IFC,	historiographies	of	the	defaulting	countries	usually	approach	them	in	the	context	of	 imperialism	 debate,	 since	 a	 direct	 consequence	 of	 foreign	 control	 was	 the	partial	loss	of	fiscal	and/or	political	sovereignty	of	the	debtor	states.	In	this	view,	foreign	 control	 of	 government	 revenues	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 imperialist	rivalry	 over	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	 the	 Balkans	 before	 1914	 (Blaisdell,	 1966;	Crouchley,	1938;	Levandis,	1944;	Zourai,	1998).	In	this	paper,	I	focus	on	the	mechanism	through	which	IFC	functioned	and	reinforced	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 defaulting	 sovereigns	 in	 comparative	perspective.	Unlike	previous	line	of	research,	I	avoid	labelling	and	discussing	IFC	as	 “sanctions”	or	 “punishment”	or	direct	 instruments	of	 imperialism.	 Instead,	 I																																																									6	“The	New	Turkish	Loan”.	Economist	[London,	England],	22	December	1860:	1417. 			
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highlight	the	fiscal	dimension	of	IFC	as	revenue	collecting	foreign	agents	and	the	lending	conditionality	it	implied.	In	order	to	provide	the	historical	context	to	the	discussion,	 the	 next	 section	 focuses	 on	 the	 mechanism	 through	 which	 IFC	operated	in	the	region	and	the	particular	characteristics	of	each	case.	I	then	focus	on	the	questions	of	ownership	and	success	record	of	IFC.		
3. Evolution	of	international	financial	control	in	the	European	
periphery	
	For	 the	 period	 1870-1913,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 two	 distinct	 waves	 of	sovereign	defaults	 taking	place	during	1875-1882	and	1890-1900.	Response	to	these	defaults	not	only	varied	from	case	to	case	but	there	were	also	differences	between	 the	 two	 episodes	 due	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 institutions	 governing	international	sovereign	debt	market	and	more	particularly	of	IFC.	As	mentioned	briefly	in	the	introduction,	the	early	episode	witnessed	more	direct	forms	of	IFC,	where	the	creditors	involved	in	the	financial	affairs	of	defaulting	countries	more	extensively.	 After	 1890,	 the	 involvement	 of	 IFC	 into	 financial	 affairs	 remained	relatively	 limited	 and	 supervisory.	 Below	 I	 first	 focus	 on	 the	 initial	 era	 of	 IFC,	namely	political	and	fiscal	control	in	Egypt	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	respectively.	In	the	second	half	of	this	section,	I	turn	my	attention	to	the	experience	of	Serbia	and	Greece,	which	was	characterized	by	lesser	degrees	of	infringement	into	the	sovereignty	of	debtor	states.			
3.1.	From	military	takeover	to	fiscal	control:	Egypt	and	the	Ottoman	Empire		The	first	IFC	in	the	European	periphery	during	the	period	1870-1914	appeared	in	Egypt	 in	1875.	Despite	being	a	semi-autonomous	country,	Egypt	was	de	jure	part	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	until	1914	and	ruled	by	hereditary	pashas	called	the	Khedives.	In	1862,	for	the	first	time	in	Egypt’s	history,	the	Khedive	negotiated	a	state	loan	with	the	permission	of	the	Ottoman	Sultan.	This	loan	was	followed	by	several	others	and	during	 the	period	1862-75	 the	Egyptian	government	 issued	ten	bonds	with	 the	 support	 of	 several	British	 and	French	banking	houses	 (see	Table	1).	The	main	 lending	conditionality	 for	these	bonds	was	the	requirement	to	 assign	 some	 of	 the	 tax	 revenues	 to	 the	 repayment	 of	 these	 loans.	 These	included	 the	 land	 taxes	 of	 the	 several	 provinces,	 general	 revenues	 of	 the	Egyptian	state,	and	personal	estates	of	 the	Khedive.	Taken	 together	 the	overall	guarantees	corresponded	to	almost	entire	revenues	of	the	Egyptian	government	in	 1875,	 hence	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	 contract	 further	 loans	 in	 international	markets	 with	 a	 similar	 guaranty	 (Crouchley,	 1938:	 122;	 Tuncer,	 2015:	 29-34;	Wynne,	1951:	582).	
	 7	
Meanwhile,	 the	default	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire	 in	 late	1875	had	a	direct	impact	 on	Egyptian	 credit	 abroad	and	 it	was	no	 longer	possible	 to	obtain	new	loans	from	the	international	financial	markets	and,	in	April	1876,	the	payment	of	Egypt’s	treasury	bonds	was	suspended.	This	failure	led	to	the	foundation	of	IFC	under	 the	official	name	of	 “Caisse	de	la	Dette	Publique	Égyptienne”	on	May	2nd,	1876.	 Directed	 by	 foreign	 commissioners	 nominated	 by	 their	 respective	governments	 the	 Caisse	 was	 authorized	 to	 receive	 the	 revenues	 intended	 to	service	the	debt	directly	from	the	local	authorities.	Taxes	from	several	Egyptian	provinces,	 the	 salt	 and	 tobacco	 taxes	 along	 with	 custom	 revenues,	 which	corresponded	 to	 almost	 three	 quarters	 of	 total	 government	 revenues	 in	 1876,	were	 assigned	 to	 the	Caisse.	 The	 Egyptian	 government	 committed	 itself	 not	 to	modify	these	revenues	or	to	contract	any	new	loans	without	the	consent	of	the	
Caisse.	 In	November	1876,	 in	addition	 to	 the	Caisse,	 a	 special	administration	of	the	railways	and	of	the	port	of	Alexandria	was	established,	and	placed	under	the	direct	 control	 of	 a	 commission	of	 foreign	 creditors.	Moreover,	 two	 controllers-general	(one	British	and	one	French)	would	be	appointed,	who	would	exercise	a	supervision	 over	 the	 entire	 fiscal	 administration	 of	 the	 country,	 one	 mainly	responsible	of	expenditure	and	the	other	of	revenues.	The	budget	was	still	to	be	framed	 by	 the	 Khedive	 and	 his	 ministers,	 though	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	controllers-general.	Finally,	a	special	administration	of	Khedive’s	personal	lands	would	also	be	placed	under	a	separate	international	control.			[TABLE	1	HERE]		The	political	consequence	of	all	these	new	regulations	was	the	exclusion	of	the	Khedive	from	the	administration	of	Egyptian	finances,	and	transition	from	the	personal	government	of	the	Khedive	to	a	government	by	an	executive	council	whose	 leading	 members	 were	 foreigners.	 This	 radical	 change	 first	 led	 to	 the	burst	of	violent	riots	and	later	gained	an	anti-European	character.	 It	eventually	resulted	 in	military	 intervention	of	Britain	 in	1882.	Within	 a	 few	months	 after	the	British	took	charge,	the	Anglo-French	dual	control	was	abolished.	The	British	Consul-General	 was	 given	 authority	 over	 all	 the	 English	 advisors	 that	 were	placed	in	the	Egyptian	ministries.	However,	the	British	consuls	did	not	have	the	power	 to	 modify	 the	 previous	 agreement	 with	 the	 bondholders.	 French	government	and	bondholder	representatives	refused	to	permit	any	reduction	in	the	 authority	 of	 the	Caisse.	Moreover,	 the	 separate	 administrations	of	 railways	and	 estates	 of	 the	 Khedive,	 on	 all	 of	 which	 France	 was	 represented,	 were	maintained	(Wynne,	1951:	621-622).	From	1885	onwards,	Egyptian	finances	started	to	 improve,	and	by	1890	the	budget	yielded	a	surplus.	In	the	meantime,	the	Caisse	kept	servicing	the	debt	and	 accumulating	 extensive	 amount	 of	 reserve	 funds	 and	 refused	 the	 give	authorisation	to	the	Egyptian	government	to	use	any	balance	for	the	purposes	of	additional	expenditure.	The	commissioners	were	content	to	maintain	the	Caisse	
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as	an	agent	managing	the	servicing	of	the	debt,	however,	its	extensive	privileges	had	 started	 becoming	 too	 restrictive.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 new	 agreement	 between	Britain	 and	 France	 in	 April	 1904,	 the	 Entente	 Cordiale,	 which	 introduced	 a	change	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 Caisse.	 After	 the	 agreement,	 the	 Egyptian	government	obtained	full	control	of	the	reserve	funds,	leaving	the	Caisse	a	small	reserve	plus	a	working	balance.	The	rigid	model	of	balance	was	abandoned	and	the	Egyptian	 government	 regained	more	 control	 over	 fiscal	matters.	 In	 theory,	the	Caisse	still	possessed	considerable	powers	of	control,	retained	its	position	in	Egypt	until	the	complete	repayment	of	the	debt,	however	its	functions	were	now	limited	to	receiving	certain	assigned	revenues	on	behalf	of	the	bondholders,	and	ensuring	the	due	payments	(Crouchley,	1938:	169-179;	Feis,	1974:	393;	Tuncer,	2015:	48-52).	The	Caisse	emerged	out	of	a	combination	of	political,	economic	and	legal	 factors	meant	 a	 direct	 form	 of	 conditionality	 as	 it	 transferred	 the	 entire	fiscal	policymaking	into	the	hands	of	foreign	creditors	in	return	for	future	access	in	international	financial	markets.		A	 similar	 process	 led	 to	 a	 different	 form	of	 IFC	 in	 the	Ottoman	Empire,	which	 faced	with	default	almost	at	 the	same	time	with	Egypt.	Starting	with	the	Crimean	War	 in	1854,	 issuing	bonds	 in	 international	markets	became	the	most	important	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	 budgetary	 difficulties	 for	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	From	1854	 to	 1876	 the	Ottoman	 government	 contracted	18	 loans	with	 a	 total	face	 value	 of	 £219	 million.	 In	 general,	 these	 loans	 had	 similar	 lending	conditionality	arrangements	and	they	were	secured	on	wide	range	of	direct	and	indirect	tax	revenues,	custom	duties	and	Egyptian	tribute	(see	Table	1).	Financial	markets	 were	 aware	 of	 the	 unsustainability	 of	 this	 rapid	 increase	 in	 debt,	especially	after	the	crisis	of	1873	when	overseas	lending	came	to	an	end	and	it	became	almost	 impossible	for	the	Ottoman	government	to	contract	a	new	loan.	In	October	1875,	 the	Ottoman	government	 first	 suspended	part	 of	 the	 interest	payments,	and	in	January	1876	defaulted	on	all	its	outstanding	debt,	which	then	stood	at	around	£191	million	(Eldem,	2005;	Kiray,	1988;	Pamuk,	1978).	This	was	a	“long-predicted	catastrophe”7,	but	what	made	it	exceptional	was	the	scale	of	it,	as	it	was	the	biggest	sovereign	default	to	the	date.8		European	press	 referred	 the	 event	 as	 “financial	 barbarism”9,	which	 also	meant	 that	 the	 international	 financial	 markets	 were	 closed	 to	 the	 Ottoman	Empire	 after	 1876	 until	 the	 government	 and	 bondholders	 could	 reach	 a	reasonable	 deal.	 The	 successful	 settlement	 of	 the	 debt	 would	 not	 be	 achieved	until	1881.	According	to	the	agreement,	the	outstanding	debt	of	the	empire	was	reduced	from	about	£191	million	to	£96	million,	and	unpaid	interest	payments,	which	were	amounted	£62	million,	were	reduced	to	approximately	£10	million.	In	 return,	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 Administration	 for	 the	 Ottoman	 Public	 Debt																																																									7	“The	Turkish	Repudiation”	Economist	[London,	England]	9	Oct.	1875:	1190	8	The	 other	 two	 significant	 cases	were	 Spain,	which	 defaulted	 on	 an	 outstanding	 debt	 of	 £170	million,	and	Egypt	on	around	£100	million	as	discussed	above.	Suter	(1990:	67-69).	9	“The	Turkish	Default.”	Economist	[London,	England]	6	Nov.	1875:	1310	
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(thereafter	the	Council)	was	established	to	represent	the	bondholders	and	act	in	their	interest.	The	government	agreed	to	transfer	the	revenues	from	the	tobacco	and	salt	monopolies,	several	custom	duties	and	the	silk	tithe	of	several	provinces	to	the	foreign	creditors,	who	would	have	complete	freedom	to	decide	on	the	way	of	collection	and	production	(Tuncer,	2015:	58-63).	Starting	 from	1883,	 the	Council	 established	more	 than	 twenty	offices	 in	the	 various	provinces	 of	 the	Empire	 extending	 from	Yemen	 to	 Salonika,	which	were	administered	from	the	central	office	in	Istanbul.	This	was	an	extensive	tax	collection	network	employing	around	4500-5000	officers	(including	 inspectors,	collectors,	 security	 guards	 etc.).	 The	 lessons	 derived	 from	 the	 Egyptian	experience,	 and	 the	 fear	 of	 resistance	 from	 the	 local	 population	 made	 the	representatives	 of	 bondholders	 to	 choose	 the	 gradual	method	 of	 replacing	 the	existing	local	staff,	introducing	new	techniques	of	production	and	reforming	the	existing	 collection	 system	 for	 the	 ceded	 revenues.	One	of	 the	biggest	 obstacles	that	 the	 Council	 was	 faced	 during	 this	 period	 was	 the	 widespread	 “armed	banditry”	 and	 opposition	 against	 the	 administration	 of	 foreign	 creditors.	However,	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 Council	 remained	 limited	 to	popular	 resistance,	 since	 there	 were	 no	 conflicts	 between	 the	 Ottoman	government	and	the	Council	(Quataert,	1983;	Tuncer,	2015:	64-76).	Despite	 the	 contraband	 and	popular	 resistance	 to	 the	 Council,	 it	 turned	out	 to	 work	 efficiently	 in	 its	 management	 of	 the	 resources	 for	 which	 it	 was	responsible.	 Both	 the	 revenues	 from	 direct	 contributions	 (silk,	 salt,	 spirits,	stamps	 and	 fisheries),	 and	 from	 Tobacco	Régie	 increased	 significantly.	 In	 fact,	after	1889	the	Ottoman	government	decided	to	extend	the	rights	of	the	Council	to	collect	revenues	for	its	own	account.	According	to	the	agreement	the	Council	would	 be	 responsible	 of	 collecting	 the	 revenues	 especially	 for	 those	 loans	concerning	 the	 railways	 together	with	 tithes	of	 several	provinces.	The	Council,	after	 collecting	and	reducing	 the	collection	expenses,	would	 transfer	 the	entire	net	 revenue	 to	 the	 government.	Therefore,	 the	 expenses	of	 administration	 and	collection	of	these	revenues	were	borne	by	the	revenues	themselves,	and	did	not	fall	 upon	 the	 revenues	 ceded	 to	 the	bondholders.	 	 From	 the	perspective	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire	this	operation	was	preferable	not	only	to	show	its	willingness	to	reinstate	its	credibility	in	the	eyes	of	the	creditors	but	also	it	reflected	the	fact	that	creditors	were	proven	 to	be	more	successful	 to	collect	and	administer	 the	revenues.	For	the	creditors,	on	the	other	hand,	the	extension	of	transfer	of	fiscal	sovereignty	was	seen	as	a	sign	of	trust	between	them	and	the	government,	which	in	 return	secured	 the	position	of	 the	Council	 in	 the	overall	 fiscal	 system	of	 the	Empire	(Tuncer,	2015:	64-78).	This	 brief	 historical	 presentation	 of	 sovereign	 debt	 in	 Egypt	 and	 the	Ottoman	 Empire	 highlights	 some	 important	 aspects	 of	 pre-1914	 lending	conditionality.	 In	 both	 cases,	 international	 political	 considerations	 played	 an	important	role	in	the	way	IFC	was	established	and	organised,	however	the	legal	justification	 of	 such	 control	 was	 based	 on	 the	 lending	 conditionality	 clauses	
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included	 into	 the	 bond	 contracts	 –i.e.	 hypothecation	 of	 future	 revenues	 for	repayment	 of	 bonds.	 Once	 in	 operation,	 IFC	 transformed	 into	 direct	 form	conditionality	 as	 it	 secured	 access	 of	 Egypt	 and	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 into	international	 financial	markets	by	 imposing	a	 set	of	 changes	 in	 fiscal	policy.	 In	Egypt,	 although	 IFC	 was	 originally	 planned	 to	 play	 a	 similar	 role	 as	 in	 the	Ottoman	Empire,	it	eventually	became	a	prelude	to	British	military	take	over	and	it	was	reinforced	by	other	means	of	political	and	economic	control.	The	Egyptian	government	did	not	have	any	choice	but	to	“cooperate”	-hence	the	weight	of	the	
Caisse	 in	 overall	 tax	 collection	 remained	 significant	 until	 1904.	 The	 IFC	 in	 the	Ottoman	 Empire,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 operated	 without	 the	 intermediation	 of	 the	political	representatives	of	the	creditor	states	involved,	hence	its	success	would	still	 depend	 on	 the	 “ownership”	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 government.	 Bondholder	representatives,	having	autonomy	on	the	way	that	 they	managed	hypothecated	revenues,	 implemented	 both	 short-	 and	 long-term	 solutions	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	compensate	 for	 their	 losses	and	 to	 increase	 the	ceded	revenues	and	eventually	started	managing	revenues	on	behalf	of	the	Ottoman	government	as	well.		
	
3.2.	From	fiscal	control	to	financial	supervision:	Serbia	and	Greece	
	IFC	established	in	1875-76	in	Egypt	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	economically	and	politically	costly	for	creditors	and	their	respective	governments,	since	such	an	 infringement	 into	 the	 sovereignty	 resulted	 in	 popular	 armed	 resistance	 in	both	cases.	Therefore,	when	the	new	wave	of	sovereign	debt	crisis	hit	the	small	Balkan	 economies	 during	 1890s,	 creditors	 and	 their	 respective	 governments	were	 aware	of	 the	need	 for	 introducing	more	 indirect	 and	 less	 costly	 forms	of	managing	and	transferring	revenues.	Although	 IFC	was	came	 into	existence	 in	Serbia	 three	years	earlier	 than	Greece	 in	 1895,	 the	 history	 of	 its	 sovereign	 debt	 did	 not	 start	 until	 it	 was	recognised	 as	 an	 independent	 state	 in	 the	 Berlin	 Congress	 in	 1878.10	From	 its	independence	 to	 1893,	 the	 Serbian	 government	 contracted	 17	 loans	 in	 the	financial	 markets	 London,	 Paris	 and	 Vienna	 with	 a	 face	 value	 of	 around	 £16	millions	and	an	average	effective	interest	rate	of	6.7	per	cent	(see	Table	1).	The	repayments	 of	 these	 loans	 were	 secured	 on	 future	 revenues	 of	 the	 state	including	import	duties,	revenues	from	railways,	land	taxes	of	several	provinces	and	monopolies	 of	 tobacco	 and	 salt.	However,	 these	 loans	were	not	 enough	 to	meet	 increasing	 state	 expenditure	 driven	mostly	 by	 the	 railway	 building,	 debt	service	and	military	spending.		By	 1893,	 the	 outstanding	 debt	 of	 the	 country	 had	 reached	 around	 £13	million	and	the	annual	charges	on	the	debt	stock	were	consuming	more	than	one																																																									10	The	only	exceptions	 to	 this	were	 the	 loans	granted	 in	 support	of	 independence	wars	against	the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 during	 the	 1860s	 and	 1870s	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Russia	 (Feis,	 1974:	 262;	Gnjatovic,	2009:	5;	Hinic	et	al.,	2014;	Sundhaussen,	1989:	500).	
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third	of	state	revenues.	In	the	meantime,	with	the	default	of	Greece	in	the	same	year,	there	were	further	increasing	concerns	regarding	the	financial	condition	of	Serbia.	 In	 late	1894,	the	Serbian	monarch	Milan	started	lobbying	for	a	financial	arrangement.	 A	 loan	 contract	was	 signed	 on	December	 26,	 1894,	 payments	 of	which	 were	 secured	 by	 the	 state	 monopolies	 of	 petroleum,	 cigarette	 paper,	matches	 and	 salt	 and	overall	 revenues	 of	 the	 state.	 The	proposed	 scheme	 also	envisaged	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 special	 administration	 consisting	 of	 four	delegates	 –two	nominated	by	 the	 Serbian	 government,	 and	 two	by	 contracting	banks-	 to	 collect	 and	 administer	 the	 receipts	 from	 monopolies	 on	 a	 monthly	basis.	The	Serbian	National	Assembly	 rejected	 this	 scheme	as	 the	arrangement	was	 seen	 very	 similar	 what	 was	 offered	 to	 Greece	 at	 the	 time	 and	 implied	 a	financial	control	and	empowering	a	foreign	financial	group	for	the	conversion	of	foreign	debt.		The	 decision	 to	 reject	 a	 debt	 conversion	 meant	 that	 by	 mid-1895	 the	government	was	unable	to	meet	the	amount	due	in	interest	and	principal	on	the	floating	 debt.	 In	 June	 1895,	 negotiations	 to	 discuss	 a	 solution	 started	 between	the	syndicate	of	underwriting	banks	from	London,	Paris,	Vienna	and	Berlin,	the	Russian	 government	 and	 the	 Serbian	 officials	 in	 a	 conference	 at	 Karlsbad.	Eventually	 a	 new	 loan	with	 a	 face	 value	 of	 around	 £14	millions	 at	 4	 per	 cent	interest	 rate	was	agreed	 to	 convert	 the	outstanding	debt.	This	was	 secured	on	the	net	profits	of	certain	railways,	stamp	duty,	customs	duties,	profits	 from	the	salt	monopoly	and	the	revenue	from	the	monopoly	on	mineral	oils,	matches	and	cigarette	 paper.	 More	 importantly	 the	 Autonomous	 Administration	 of	Monopolies	 at	 Belgrade	 (hereafter	 the	 Administration)	 would	 control	 these	revenues	for	the	purposes	of	servicing	the	debt	(Tuncer,	2015:	79-99).	The	 managing	 council	 of	 the	 Administration	 was	 appointed	 by	 a	 royal	decree	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 however	 the	 freedom	 of	 action	 of	 the	Serbian	 government	 was	 still	 limited:	 two	 out	 of	 the	 six	 members	 were	representatives	 of	 the	 foreign	 creditors.	 	 Other	 members	 consisted	 of	 the	governor	and	the	vice-governor	of	the	National	Bank	of	Serbia	and	two	Serbian	nationals	 appointed	 with	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Administration.	 Overall,	from	1895	to	1913	the	Serbian	government	managed	to	contract	a	new	series	of	loans	with	a	face	value	of	£39	million	and	an	average	effective	interest	rate	of	5	per	 cent	 (see	 Table	 1).	 Despite	 the	 initial	 discontent,	 once	 in	 operation,	 the	government	and	the	Administration	worked	more	or	less	in	harmony	and	the	net	yield	of	 the	monopolies	and	other	pledged	revenues	steadily	grew	to	an	extent	that	it	not	only	covered	the	interest	payments	on	the	outstanding	debt	but	also	yielded	 a	 surplus.	 Although	 the	 Administration	 remained	 autonomous,	 it	 was	bound	by	the	technical	and	legal	decision	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	therefore	it	did	not	enjoy	the	greater	flexibility	and	freedom	as	much	as	the	Ottoman	Council	or	 the	Egyptian	Caisse.	 (Lampe	and	 Jackson,	1982:	156-195;	Tuncer,	2015:	79-99).	
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Unlike	Serbia,	the	history	of	sovereign	debt	in	Greece	can	be	traced	back	to	 1820s	 when	 Greece	 contracted	 three	 loans	 amounting	 to	 £6.8	 millions	 to	finance	 its	 independence	war	 against	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 These	 issues	 were	secured	with	the	future	tax	revenues	of	the	Greek	state,	including	custom	duties,	the	 salt	mines	 and	 fisheries	 and	 ultimately	 by	 all	 public	 revenues.	However,	 it	was	not	easy	to	raise	tax	revenues	in	newly	founded	state	and	in	1843	the	Greek	government	defaulted	on	all	 three	 loans	(Kofas,	1981;	Wynne,	1951:	283-287).	This	year	marked	 the	beginning	of	a	 long	 isolation	 from	 international	 financial	markets.	 Despite	 repeated	 attempts	 of	 bondholder	 representatives,	 it	 was	 not	until	 the	 1860s	 that	 the	 parties	 formally	 began	 discussing	 proposals	 for	 a	settlement,	and	an	agreement	was	 finally	concluded	 in	September	1878,	which	satisfied	the	both	parties.			From	1879	to	1893,	the	Greek	government	contracted	9	loans	with	a	face	value	of	approximately	£25	million	and	average	effective	interest	rate	of	6.7	per	cent.	Similar	to	other	cases,	the	payments	of	these	bonds	were	secured	through	the	 special	 assignment	 of	 revenues.	 Among	 the	 loans	 contracted	 during	 this	period,	 the	Monopoly	Loan	of	1887	had	a	 special	place	because	 it	 came	with	a	particular	 lending	 conditionality,	which	 later	 became	 the	 foundation	 on	which	the	 IFC	 was	 built.	 According	 to	 the	 agreement,	 besides	 the	 hypothecation	 of	monopoly	revenues,	 the	creditors	were	given	the	right	to	establish	a	Monopoly	Society	(Société	de	Régie	des	Revenues	de	Gréce).	This	company	was	put	under	the	control	of	the	Greek	government	and	granted	the	right	to	administer,	collect	and	supervise	 the	 assigned	 revenues.	 The	 company	was	 subject	 to	 Greek	 laws	 and	was	 to	 be	 terminated	 upon	 the	 settlement	 of	 the	 loan.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	government	 was	 required	 to	 make	 up	 the	 difference	 from	 the	 treasury	 if	 the	proceeds	 of	 the	 assigned	 monopolies	 were	 insufficient	 to	 meet	 the	 annual	charges	 of	 the	 loan.	 In	 return	 for	 these	 concessions,	 the	 Greek	 government	managed	 to	 contract	 the	 largest	 loan	with	 lowest	 effective	 interest	 rate	 in	 this	period.	However,	the	Monopoly	Loan	was	not	enough	to	stop	the	deterioration	of	the	 Greek	 finances.	 In	 1893,	 because	 of	 worsening	 economic	 conditions,	 the	government	defaulted	on	its	foreign	obligations.	Moreover,	the	revenues,	which	were	under	the	administration	of	the	Monopoly	Society,	were	handed	directly	to	the	 public	 treasury,	 thus	 violating	 the	 earlier	 agreement	 with	 the	 creditors	(Levandis,	1944:	55-69;	Lazaretou,	2005).		From	 the	 outset,	 one	 of	 the	main	 concerns	 of	 the	 bondholders	was	 the	Greek	government’s	unilateral	modification	of	the	Monopoly	Society’s	rights,	and	the	 earlier	 agreement	 on	 the	way	 in	which	 these	hypothecated	 revenues	were	collected.	 The	 revenues	 specially	 assigned	 as	 guarantees	 for	 the	 service	 of	different	 loans	 consisted	 of	 the	 customs	 receipts	 from	 several	 major	 ports,	tobacco	 tax,	 stamp	dues,	 receipts	 of	 the	monopolies	 of	 salt,	 petroleum,	playing	cards,	matches,	cigarette	paper	and	emery	and	the	revenues	of	several	railways.	The	committee	was	keen	to	combine	these	revenues	to	create	a	surplus	for	the	servicing	the	debt.	Moreover,	unlike	other	cases,	creditors	were	concerned	about	
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the	 situation	of	 the	money	market,	 in	particular	 the	 instability	of	 the	exchange	rates	 and	 excessive	 amount	 of	 notes	 in	 circulation.	 As	 the	 Greek	 government	opposed	to	several	proposals	of	creditors	and	demanded	significant	reduction	in	the	outstanding	debt,	the	negotiations	almost	came	to	a	dead	end.	Meanwhile,	in	1897,	Greece	found	herself	in	conflict	with	the	Ottoman	Empire	over	the	Cretan	Question,	which	led	to	the	Greek-Turkish	War	of	1897	and	the	defeat	of	Greece.	According	to	the	peace	terms,	determined	through	the	mediation	of	six	powers	(Austria-Hungary,	France,	Germany,	Great	Britain,	Italy	and	Russia),	Greece	was	condemned	 to	 pay	 a	 war	 indemnity,	 which	made	 the	 financial	 position	 of	 the	country	 even	 worse.	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 Greece	 no	 longer	 had	bargaining	power	with	its	creditors.		In	1898,	the	Greek	government	agreed	to	sign	the	Law	of	Control	with	the	representatives	 of	 foreign	 powers.	 IFC	 was	 to	 be	 confided	 in	 a	 commission	established	 in	 Athens	 and	 composed	 of	 diplomatic	 representatives	 of	 the	mediating	 powers.	 The	 gross	 proceeds	 of	 the	 monopolies	 (salt,	 petroleum,	matches,	 playing	 cards	 and	 cigarette	 paper),	 tobacco,	 stamp	 and	 import	 dues	collected	 by	 the	 customs	 house	 of	 Piraeus	 were	 assigned	 to	 the	 service	 debt.	Finally,	 the	collection	of	 these	revenues	was	placed	 in	 the	hands	of	 the	Society	registered	 in	 Greece,	 which	 would	 be	 under	 the	 absolute	 control	 of	 the	Commission.	 Immediately	 after	 the	 delegation	 of	 the	 Commission,	 the	representatives	of	the	powers	started	to	investigate	ways	to	improve	and	extract	the	 highest	 sum	 from	 the	 revenues	 under	 their	 control.	 Therefore,	 in	 order	 to	introduce	 a	 change	 in	 the	 production	methods,	 the	 Commission	 could	 ask	 the	government	 to	 modify	 the	 relevant	 laws	 and	 regulations	 regarding	 certain	revenues,	but	did	not	enjoy	the	same	right	of	direct	management	of	revenues	as	in	 Egypt,	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 Serbia.	 In	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 revenues	under	its	control,	the	Commission	urged	the	government	to	pass	certain	laws	to	modify	 production	 and	 taxation	 of	 revenues	 under	 its	 control,	 however	 these	bills	and	laws	were	either	not	passed	by	the	Greek	Chamber,	or,	when	they	were	passed,	 were	 not	 enforced	 by	 the	 government.	 Part	 of	 the	 problem	 was	unwillingness	of	the	Greek	government	to	cooperate	with	the	foreign	creditors.	As	a	result	the	Commission	also	showed	reluctance	to	act	as	a	trustee	for	future	loans	in	international	financial	markets	(Tuncer,	2015:	100-122).	The	Greek	and	Serbian	cases	show	significant	differences	compared	to	the	direct	 forms	of	 control	 exercised	over	 the	Ottoman	and	Egyptian	 finances.	The	degree	of	cooperation	of	Greek	and	Serbian	governments	was	not	as	extensive	as	the	 previous	 two	 cases,	 and	 IFC	 operated	 in	 a	 politically	 more	 challenging	environment,	hence	the	problem	of	ownership	of	IFC	policies	became	even	more	important.	Moreover,	the	tax	collection	was	organised	with	the	intermediation	of	semi-independent	 companies,	 which	 gave	 further	 scope	 of	 freedom	 to	 the	governments.	In	the	next	section,	I	compare	the	varying	degrees	of	success	of	IFC	in	 a	 more	 systematic	 way.	 I	 then	 explore	 the	 issue	 of	 ownership	 or	 the	willingness	and	ability	of	governments	to	cooperate	with	IFC.		
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4. Success	and	extent	of	international	financial	control	
	In	 this	 section	 I	 aim	 to	 establish	 the	 degree	 of	 control	 exercised	 by	 IFC	 in	 a	comparative	 way	 and	 relate	 it	 with	 the	 success	 in	 restoring	 access	 of	 debtor	states	 into	 international	 financial	 markets.	 As	 a	 measure	 of	 credibility	 and	sovereign	risk,	it	is	possible	to	rely	on	monthly	bond	spreads	to	judge	the	degree	of	recovery	following	defaults.11			 [FIGURE	1	HERE]		As	 seen	 from	 the	 Figure	 1,	 the	 impact	 of	 IFC	 following	 debt	 settlement	was	 a	 steady	decline	 in	 bond	 spreads	 in	 all	 four	 cases.	However,	 in	 the	 longer	term	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 Egypt	 benefited	 from	 a	 much	 more	 significant	decline:	compared	to	pre-IFC	period	of	borrowing	the	bond	spreads	declined	on	average	 96	 per	 cent	 and	 80	 per	 cent	 respectively.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 1913,	 bond	spreads	 of	 Egypt	was	 around	2.1	per	 cent	whereas	 the	Ottoman	bond	 spreads	were	as	 low	as	0.78	per	cent.	For	Serbia	and	Greece,	 the	decline	 in	bond	yields	was	 not	 as	 fast:	 in	 1913	 compared	 to	 pre-IFC	 period	 bond	 spreads	 declined	around	70	per	cent	in	Serbian	case	and	almost	55	per	cent	in	the	case	of	Greece.	By	the	end	of	1913,	Serbian	bond	spreads	stood	at	1.2	per	cent	whereas	Greek	spreads	were	still	at	a	relatively	higher	level	of	7.7	per	cent.	Overall,	the	evidence	suggests	 that	 IFC	 was	 not	 always	 successful	 in	 reinstating	 the	 credibility	 and	there	was	 no	 uniform	 response	 of	markets	 towards	 the	 lending	 conditionality	introduced	by	IFC.		A	possible	venue	to	seek	an	explanation	for	this	difference	is	the	degree	of	control	exercised	by	bondholder	representatives	over	host	countries,	which	can	be	considered	 in	administrative	and	 fiscal	 terms.	 In	 terms	of	administration,	 in	Egypt	 the	 IFC	 had	 the	 most	 extensive	 privileges	 and	 the	 foreign	 control	 over	Egyptian	 politics	 and	 finance	 was	 reinforced	 by	 additional	 means	 and	organisations	 and	 the	 Caisse	 transformed	 into	 the	 imperium	in	 imperio.	 In	 the	case	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 the	 Council	 also	 enjoyed	 the	 freedom	 of	 directly	collecting	 the	 revenues	 assigned	 for	 the	 repayment	of	 the	outstanding	debt.	 In	doing	so,	 it	established	an	extensive	network	and	worked	 in	harmony	with	 the	Ottoman	government,	which	was	willing	to	extend	the	privileges	of	 the	IFC.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 in	 Serbia	 and	 Greece,	 the	 IFC	 operated	 via	 relatively	 more	independent	organisations	and	they	did	not	penetrate	into	the	finances	of	these																																																									11	Bond	spreads	are	calculated	as	the	difference	between	current	yield	of	representative	bonds	of	each	country	minus	 the	British	Consol	and	French	Rentes	yields.	See	 the	notes	 for	Figure	1	 for	details.		
	 15	
economies	 as	 much	 as	 Egypt	 or	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Greece,	diplomatic	 representatives,	 who	 had	 supervisory	 power	 over	 tax	 collection,	found	themselves	in	conflict	with	the	parliament	and	it	proved	to	be	difficult	to	implement	 most	 of	 the	 fiscal	 reforms.	 In	 Serbia,	 the	 Administration	 and	 the	government	worked	 in	 relative	 harmony.	However,	 unlike	 the	 other	 cases,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 managing	 council	 of	 the	 Administration	 consisted	 of	 Serbian	nationals,	 including	 the	 president	 and	 vice-president	 of	 the	National	 Bank	 and	two	government	officials,	who	contributed	positively	to	the	political	justification	of	the	Administration.			[TABLE	2	HERE]		 In	 fiscal	 terms,	as	seen	from	Figure	2,	 the	revenues	under	the	control	of	IFC	 steadily	 increased	 in	most	 of	 the	 cases.	 The	most	 significant	 loss	 of	 fiscal	sovereignty	took	place	in	Egypt,	where	the	IFC	revenues	constituted	on	average	40	per	cent	of	total	revenues	of	the	government.	In	its	early	years,	the	revenues	under	the	control	of	the	Caisse	reached	to	more	than	70	per	cent	creating	unrest	among	the	taxpayers.	In	the	case	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	the	revenues	controlled	by	 the	Council	on	behalf	of	 the	creditors	was	on	average	13	per	cent,	however	after	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 revenues	 controlled	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Ottoman	government,	the	assets	under	the	control	of	the	Council	reached	to	35	per	cent	of	all	revenues	of	the	state.	For	Greece	and	Serbia	the	shares	were	respectively	on	average	29	and	35	per	cent	for	the	period	IFC	was	in	operation.	In	all	cases	the	revenues	of	 IFC	at	 least	doubled	from	the	first	year	of	the	control	to	the	World	War	 1.	 In	 absolute	 terms,	 the	Ottoman	 Council	was	 the	 biggest	 of	 all	 –at	 least	after	 the	 Entente	 Cordiale,	 which	 changed	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 Caisse	 and	significantly	reduced	its	influence	in	the	overall	Egyptian	finances.	Despite	high	level	 of	 revenues	under	 control,	 in	 terms	of	 growth	performance,	 the	Ottoman	Council	 and	 the	 Egyptian	 Caisse	 managed	 an	 average	 annual	 growth	 rate	 of	around	2	per	 cent	 and	0.7	per	 cent	 respectively.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	Greek	Commission	and	the	Serbian	Administration	enjoyed	an	average	annual	growth	rate	of	around	6	per	cent.	In	other	words,	despite	the	political	resistance,	IFC	in	the	Balkans	performed	relatively	more	efficiently	in	increasing	its	revenues.	This	was	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 low	 costs	 of	 collection	 in	 Serbia	 and	 Greece	 mostly	conditioned	by	the	type	of	revenue	each	IFC	controlled	and	monetisation	level	of	each	economy.			[FIGURE	2	HERE]		 To	summarise,	the	enforcement	and	conditionality	introduced	by	IFC	was	effective	in	improving	the	credibility	of	the	defaulting	sovereigns.	They	achieved	this	 by	 regularly	 transferring	 the	 surplus	 from	 assigned	 revenues	 to	 the	bondholders	 in	 order	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	 losses.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 local	
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resistance	 to/cooperation	 with	 IFC	 took	 place	 in	 changing	 degrees.	 After	 the	initial	discontent	was	over,	 IFC	 in	Egypt	and	 the	Ottoman	Empire	worked	with	relatively	 little	 political	 challenge	 to	 their	 control	 and	 had	 extensive	 freedom	over	 fiscal	matters.	 In	Serbia,	 thanks	 to	 the	administrative	 structure	of	 the	 IFC	and	strong	representation	of	Serbian	government	in	the	Administration,	the	role	of	IFC	was	mostly	confined	to	a	supervisory	level.	Finally,	in	the	case	of	Greece,	the	 political	 resistance	 to	 IFC	 remained	 strong	 throughout	 the	 period,	 and	 the	influence	of	the	Commission	was	limited	to	monetary	affairs.	In	the	next	section,	I	 explore	 the	 issue	 of	 resistance	 towards	 IFC	 and	 propose	 a	 framework	 to	interpret	the	different	degrees	of	political	compliance	with	foreign	creditors.	
5. Political	regimes	and	resistance	to	international	financial	
control	
	Based	on	the	historical	presentation	so	far,	it	can	be	suggested	that	the	success	of	IFC	in	reinstating	the	credibility	of	debtor	states	was	considerably	influenced	by	its	 political	 environment,	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	 degree	 of	 political	representation	of	taxpayers.	This	view	is	in	line	with	the	recent	studies	in	fiscal	sociology,	 which	 highlight	 that	 two	 important	 characteristics	 of	 state	 building	process	 are	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 social	 contract	 based	 on	 negotiation	 and	bargaining	 around	 tax,	 and	 institution-building	 incentive	 provided	 by	 the	revenue	 drive.	 Combined	 together	 these	 two	 characteristics	 increase	 the	legitimacy	 of	 the	 state	 and	 accountability	 between	 the	 state	 and	 its	 citizens.	Studies	on	long-term	history	of	fiscal	states	echo	these	views	and	emphasize	that	negotiation	and	trust	in	functioning	of	fiscal	systems	was	a	common	element	in	emergence	 of	 modern	 fiscal	 states	 (Brautigam,,	 Fjeltstad	 and	 Moore,	 2008;	Martin,	Mehrotra	and	Prasad,	2009;	Tilly,	1990;	Yun-Casalilla,	2013:	12-13).	This	perspective	provides	 a	 useful	 framework	 to	 consider	 the	 relationship	 between	taxation,	 the	 public	 debt	 and	 the	 conditionality	 in	 the	 form	 of	 international	financial	control	in	the	European	periphery.	Unlike	many	other	debtor	countries,	the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 Serbia,	 Greece	 and	 Egypt	 did	 not	 face	with	 the	 trade-off	between	taxation	and	borrowing	as	their	ability	to	borrow	was	restored	by	IFC.	Moreover,	the	degree	of	development	of	the	liberal	fiscal	state	and	evolution	of	representative	institutions	were	different	in	each	case,	which	had	an	impact	on	the	 incentives	 of	 the	 governments.	 An	 implication	 of	 the	 representative	institutions	 for	 these	 dominantly	 agrarian	 economies	 of	 the	 region	 would	 be	strong	influence	of	the	countryside	in	decisions	over	taxation	of	the	rural	sector	given	 there	 existed	 a	 competitive	 election	 system,	 which	 resulted	 in	 rural	representation.		In	 terms	of	 political	 regime,	 for	 the	most	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century,	 the	Ottoman	 Empire	 remained	 as	 an	 authoritarian	 monarchy	 despite	 several	
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reforms	 aimed	 at	 modernising	 the	 state	 apparatus	 and	 significant	 political	transformations	(Karpat,	1972).	An	Ottoman	parliament	and	the	constitution	for	the	first	time	emerged	in	1876,	which	aimed	at	 introducing	accountability	over	fiscal	matters	and	regularise	the	authority	of	the	Sultan.	However,	 in	practice	it	did	not	empower	any	other	group	 than	 the	existing	Ottoman	political	elite	and	bureaucracy.	 That	 is	 why	 when	 the	 Abdulhamid	 II	 decided	 to	 suspend	 the	constitution	 and	 the	 parliament	 just	 two	 years	 later;	 there	 was	 no	 fight	 or	resistance	against	this	decision.	A	representative	assembly	was	not	successfully	established	 until	 after	 the	 Young	 Turk	 Revolution	 of	 1908.	 From	 this	 year	onwards,	the	assembly	had	the	power	to	pass	legislation	over	Sultan’s	authority	and	 the	 dominant	 political	 force	 was	 the	 nationalist	 Committee	 of	 Union	 and	Progress,	which	eventually	led	the	Empire	into	the	World	War	1	(Brown,	2002:	23-26).	 As	 for	 the	 tax	 revenues,	 they	 mostly	 relied	 on	 the	 traditional	 tithe	collected	almost	exclusively	with	the	help	of	tax	farmers.	In	order	to	finance	the	costly	 reforms	 and	 shift	 the	 tax	 burden	 from	 the	 countryside	 to	 the	 urban	centres,	 the	government	 repeatedly	but	ultimately	unsuccessfully	 attempted	 to	replace	 tax	 farming	with	 salaried	 tax	 collectors.	Moreover,	 the	 taxation	 system	remained	still	heavily	reliant	on	land	tax.	Custom	duties	had	the	potential	to	be	a	significant	revenue	source,	however,	due	to	the	capitulations	and	bilateral	trade	treaties,	the	Ottoman	government	was	not	able	to	modify	the	rates	unilaterally.	Only	in	1905,	the	powers	agreed	for	a	minor	increase	in	the	import	taxes.	Finally,	the	 personal	 tax,	 a	 symbol	 of	 transition	 to	 the	 modern	 tax	 state,	 was	 only	introduced	 in	 1903	 (Aytekin,	 2013;	 Karaman	 and	 Pamuk,	 2010:	 598;	 Özbek,	2010;	 Quataert	 1994:	 764-855;	 Shaw,	 1975).	 To	 summarise,	 unlike	 many	European	countries	during	the	same	period,	in	evolution	of	fiscal	institutions	in	the	Ottoman	Empire,	representation	and	negotiation	with	local	elite	played	very	little	role.	Throughout	 the	period	 the	Ottoman	Empire	struggled	 to	 introduce	a	centralized	 tax	 collection	 system	and	had	 to	 share	of	most	of	 the	 tax	 revenues	with	other	intermediaries	such	as	local	notables	and	tax	farmers.	Moreover,	most	of	the	revenues	were	based	on	direct	taxes	levied	mainly	upon	the	land.	To	put	it	crudely,	at	 the	 time	 the	Ottoman	Empire	defaulted	on	 its	 foreign	debt,	 it	was	a	state	 that	 was	 unable	 to	 tax.	 Given	 its	 lack	 of	 monopoly	 over	 taxation,	 the	Ottoman	government	was	more	willing	to	cooperate	with	the	foreign	creditors.		Egypt	 went	 through	 a	 completely	 different	 political	 transformation,	nonetheless	 the	negotiation	with	 local	 elites	 and	 limited	 government	were	not	the	 determinants	 of	 increases	 in	 fiscal	 capacity	 before	 1914.	As	 early	 as	 1841,	Egypt	 managed	 to	 move	 away	 from	 tax	 farming	 thanks	 to	 the	 centralisation	policies	 of	 Muhammad	 Ali.	 From	 Muhammed	 Ali’s	 death	 in	 1848	 to	 the	establishment	of	 the	European	control	 in	1876,	 the	 country	was	dominated	by	the	dynastic	state	of	the	Khedives.	Although	there	was	a	“Consultative	Chamber	of	Delegates”	since	1866	consisting	of	provincial	notables	and	landowners,	it	did	not	 have	 any	 significant	 power	 over	 taxation.	 In	 1882,	 the	 new	 Khedive	introduced	 the	 first	 constitution,	 which	 gave	 more	 authority	 to	 the	 Chamber,	
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however,	 the	constitution	was	never	 fully	 implemented,	and	when	Britain	 took	control	 of	 Egypt	 the	 same	 year,	 it	 was	 suspended.	 Under	 the	 British	 rule	 two	representative	 assemblies	 were	 founded	 in	 Egypt	 but	 they	 had	 very	 limited	power	over	fiscal	matters.	The	Legislative	Council	consisted	of	representatives	of	provincial	assemblies	but	 it	could	not	pass	any	 law	and	only	had	a	consultancy	role	 over	 the	 budget.	 The	 General	 Assembly,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 consisted	 of	mostly	provincial	notables.	Although	it	could	not	propose	any	legislation,	it	had	a	veto	power	on	taxation	and	no	new	tax	could	be	imposed	without	 its	approval.	However,	 the	 influence	of	 these	 institutions	remained	limited	under	the	British	rule,	as	on	the	side	of	the	expenditure,	almost	the	sole	authority	was	the	Caisse.	Moreover,	 Khedive’s	 British	 financial	 advisor	 served	 as	 the	 key	 political	 figure	since	 he	 had	 the	 veto	 power	 of	 all	 financial	 legislation.	 As	 regards	 the	 type	 of	taxes,	 the	 land	 tax	 constituted	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 total	 revenue	 and	 it	 was	collected	with	 the	help	of	 accountants	 established	 in	 several	 villages.	Although	there	were	efforts	to	reduce	the	burden	on	the	peasantry,	the	land	tax	was	still	considered	 as	 the	 most	 oppressive	 form	 of	 taxation	 in	 Egypt	 even	 under	 the	British	 rule.	 As	 for	 indirect	 taxes,	 government	 officials	 also	 collected	 custom	duties	and	it	had	the	rate	of	1	per	cent	on	exports	and	8	per	cent	on	imports	and	the	collection	cost	was	as	low	as	4	per	cent.	However,	Egypt	was	also	bound	with	free	 trade	 treaties	 and	 capitulations	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 (Aharoni,	 2007;	Crouchley,	 1938:	 42-57;	 Ezzel-Arab,	 2009;	 Fahmy,	 2002;	 Martin,	 2004:	 464;	Shaw,	 1962;	 Tuncer,	 2015:	 174-175).	 Overall,	 in	 Egypt	 the	 British	 controllers	were	 the	 main	 deciding	 actors	 over	 fiscal	 matters	 and	 the	 role	 of	 parliament	remained	very	 limited	until	1904	when	 the	power	of	 the	Caisse	over	 spending	was	 reduced	and	 its	 funds	were	partly	went	under	 the	 control	of	 the	Egyptian	government.		The	 relationship	 between	 fiscal	 and	 political	 institutions	 in	 the	 Balkans	was	rather	different.	Following	the	Greek	independence,	the	three	powers,	which	guaranteed	 Greek	 independence	 in	 the	 Protocols	 of	 1832,	 implemented	 a	monarchy	 without	 any	 constitutional	 restrictions.	 The	 first	 Greek	 constitution	and	representative	assembly	emerged	in	1844	as	a	result	of	a	coup	d’etat	against	King	 Otto.	 Despite	 liberal	 nature	 of	 the	 constitution,	 there	 was	 no	 significant	change	in	the	existing	political	picture	as	the	king	maintained	his	influence	over	the	parliament	until	he	was	overthrown	by	another	coup	in	1862.	According	to	the	new	constitution	of	1864,	 the	representative	assembly	elected	by	universal	direct	 suffrage	 held	 the	 whole	 legislative	 power.	 From	 1875	 to	 1890s,	 C.	Trikoupis	emerged	as	the	main	political	leader	as	a	proponent	of	economic	and	political	westernization.	He	supported	the	settlement	of	foreign	debt	and	striking	a	 deal	 with	 creditors.	 The	 implication	 of	 this	 plan	 in	 fiscal	 terms	 was	 more	taxation,	 which	 was	 not	 a	 popular	 remedy.	 After	 1895	 he	 was	 followed	 by	 T.	Deliyannis,	who	represented	a	more	traditionalist	and	populist	view,	which	was	in	favour	of	the	idea	of	Greater	Greece	and	a	more	adventures	foreign	policy.	The	competition	 between	 these	 two	 political	 parties	 shaped	 the	 attitudes	 towards	
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IFC.12	In	 terms	 of	 tax	 collection	 system,	 starting	 from	 1860s	 the	 tithe	 was	collected	in	cash	and	in	the	1870s	the	fiscal	policy	constantly	aimed	at	lowering	the	 tax	 burden	 on	 the	 peasants,	 replacing	 direct	 taxation	 by	 indirect	consumption	taxes.	As	a	final	step,	in	1880,	the	tithe	was	abandoned,	tax	farming	was	abolished	and	a	new	agricultural	fiscal	system	was	introduced	reducing	the	burden	 on	 landowners.	 After	 1860s,	 the	 fiscal	 policy	 of	 Greece	 rested	 on	 the	principles	of	deficit	financing	and	the	low	taxation	of	the	higher	classes	and	the	peasantry.	Greece	was	amongst	the	last	countries	in	Europe	to	apply	income	and	inheritance	taxes,	introduced	respectively	in	1910	and	in	1898.	As	for	the	under-taxation	of	the	peasantry,	which	constituted	the	 largest	voting	group	in	Greece.	The	fiscal	burden	as	both	direct	and	indirect	taxation	fell	on	the	middle	class	and	the	 urban	 sector.	 Peasants	 effectively	 escaped	 the	 burden	 of	 indirect	 taxes	 as	they	operated	mostly	with	subsistence	farming	(Dertilis,	1986;	Minoglou,	1995;	Palamas,	1930;	Tuncer,	2015:	176-177).	Finally,	in	Serbia,	there	were	significant	similarities	to	Greece	in	terms	of	evolution	 of	 taxation	 system	 and	 political	 institutions.	 From	 the	 early	 years	 of	the	 autonomy	 until	 late	 1860s,	 the	 Serbian	 state	 continued	 to	 modernize	 the	administrative	structure	and	its	army.	Prince	Milan	Obrenović,	who	remained	in	power	 from	 1868	 to	 1889,	 carried	 the	 Serbia	 to	 the	 independence	 and	introduced	a	new	constitution	with	significant	provisions	for	parliamentary	rule.	The	 dominant	 party	 in	 the	 assembly	 until	 1880s	was	 the	 Liberal	 Party,	which	was	 supportive	 of	 restricting	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 King	 and	 of	 improving	representative	and	parliamentary	 institutions.	 From	1887	 to	 the	World	War	1,	the	Radical	Party,	which	 ideologically	 relied	on	peasant	populism,	 remained	 in	power.	 In	 1889	 a	 new	 constitution	 voted	 by	 the	 National	 Assembly	 gave	 the	executive	power	 to	 the	King	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	National	Assembly,	which	exercised	 the	 legislative	 authority.	 The	 State	 Council	 consisted	 of	 members	appointed	 partly	 by	 the	 King,	 and	 partly	 by	 the	 Assembly	 kept	 the	 power	 to	decide	on	 the	provincial	 taxes	and	 loans,	 the	expropriation	of	private	property	for	 public	 purposes,	 and	 the	 final	 settlement	 of	 debts.	 In	 terms	of	 evolution	of	fiscal	 institutions,	 from	 1815	 onwards,	when	 Serbian	 principality	was	 granted	independence	 in	 tax	 collection	 by	 the	 Porte,	 the	 revolutionary	 leader	 Prince	Miloš	treated	local	tax	farmers	as	salaried	officials,	holding	them	responsible	for	collecting	the	head-tax,	without	 letting	them	getting	a	share	from	the	proceeds.	With	 low	 taxation	 and	 mass	 peasant	 freehold	 landownership,	 the	 situation	remained	 favourable	 for	 the	 peasantry.	 During	 the	 1880s	 and	 the	 1890s	 the	budget	 was	 permanently	 in	 deficit,	 which	 only	 changed	 after	 the	 fiscal	consolidation	 in	 1903.	 As	 for	 different	 type	 of	 taxes,	 from	 the	 early	 years	 of	independence,	the	major	indirect	tax	revenue	was	the	custom	duties	imposed	on																																																									12	The	picture	only	slightly	changed	following	another	coup	d’etat	in	1909	–similar	in	spirit	to	the	Young	 Turk	 revolution	 of	 1908-	 and	 a	 new	 constitution	 in	 1911,	 which	 introduced	 a	 second	chamber	 called	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 with	 supervisory	 function	 over	 legislation	 (Clogg,	 1997;	Spyropoulos	and	Fortsakis,	2009)	
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the	border	trade	with	Austria-Hungary.	In	the	later	years,	as	Serbia	turned	into	a	land	of	monopolies,	 the	 receipts	 of	 these	 constituted	 an	 important	 indirect	 tax	category.	Despite	the	importance	of	indirect	taxes,	direct	tax	on	land	income	also	remained	 considerable	 until	 1914.	 In	 1884,	 a	 new	 reform	 introduced	 a	progressive	 tax	 rate	 in	 land,	 which	 favoured	 large	 producers	 and	 wealthy	peasants.	 The	 opposition	 from	 this	 group	 prevented	 the	 introduction	 of	 heavy	taxes	at	 the	 top	of	 the	scale.	 In	1889,	due	to	peasant	pressure	a	new	reduction	over	 land	 tax	was	 introduced.	 For	 the	 remaining	 period,	 Serbian	 budget	more	and	 more	 relied	 on	 the	 taxation	 of	 urban	 sector	 and	 merchants	 and	 the	importance	 of	 direct	 taxes	 from	 the	 rural	 sector	 gradually	 diminished	 in	 the	overall	 revenues	 of	 the	 state	 (Gnjatovic,	 2006;	Hinić	 et	 al,	 2014;	 Lampe,	 1971;	Palairet,	1979;	Tuncer,	2015:	177-178).	The	 success	 of	 IFC	 in	 transferring	 funds	 from	 revenues	 under	 its	management	was	heavily	influenced	by	the	underlying	source	of	these	revenues.	In	 the	 cases	 of	 Egypt	 and	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire,	 the	 dominance	 of	 direct	 taxes	from	land	meant	a	relatively	small	rate	of	growth	in	total	revenues	transferred	to	the	 creditors.	 Nonetheless,	 these	 countries	 enjoyed	 a	 greater	 recovery	 in	 their	borrowing	costs	due	to	their	political	compliance	with	foreign	creditors.	On	the	contrary,	 in	 the	 small	 Balkan	 economies	 of	 Serbia	 and	 Greece,	 the	 underlying	revenue	source	of	IFC	was	mostly	indirect	taxes,	which	were	relatively	easier	to	manage,	and	they	had	significantly	higher	growth	rates	and	better	performance.	However,	this	did	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	corresponding	recovery	in	spreads	as	IFC	in	these	two	cases	faced	with	constraints	and	resistance	to	its	policies.				
6. Conclusion	
	This	 paper	 demonstrates	 the	 multi-dimensional	 character	 of	 a	 pre-1914	enforcement	 and	 conditionality	 mechanism	 implemented	 by	 the	 foreign	creditors	 following	 sovereign	 defaults.	 IFC	 resulted	with	 a	 partial	 loss	 of	 fiscal	sovereignty,	 the	 extent	 of	 which	 was	 different	 in	 each	 case	 depending	 on	 the	international	 political	 considerations	 and	 local	 institutions.	As	 a	 direct	 form	of	conditionality,	 fiscal	 rules	 introduced	 by	 IFC	 were	 effective	 in	 improving	 the	credibility	 of	 the	 defaulting	 sovereigns,	 however	 the	 speed	 and	 extend	 of	recovery	largely	depended	on	the	degree	of	cooperation	of	debtor	governments	with	the	policies	of	IFC.	In	explaining	the	lack	of	ownership	in	the	context	of	IFC,	the	 paper	 mainly	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 the	 political	 regime	 type,	 more	specifically	 political	 representation	 of	 taxpayers.	 The	 limited	 fiscal	 capacity	 of	the	Ottoman	Empire	and	Egypt	created	an	incentive	for	the	central	governments	to	cooperate	with	 foreign	creditors	and	full	compliance	with	the	conditionality.	This	cooperation	helped	to	access	to	cheap	foreign	capital	until	World	War	1.	In	
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the	absence	of	democratic	institutions,	these	two	countries	did	not	face	with	the	political	 costs	of	 conforming	 to	 fiscally	oppressive	policies	of	 IFC.	On	 the	other	hand	 young	 democracies	 of	 the	 Balkans,	 as	 in	 Serbia	 and	 Greece,	 where	 the	centralisation	of	fiscal	systems	was	already	on	its	way,	were	less	willing	to	share	the	tax	revenues	with	foreign	creditors	and	for	that	they	were	penalised	(or	not	rewarded	 as	 much	 as	 the	 others)	 in	 the	 international	 financial	 markets.	 The	broader	conclusion	to	be	drawn	from	this	comparison	is	the	importance	of	policy	environment	 predefined	 by	 the	 political	 and	 fiscal	 institutions	 of	 the	 debtor	governments.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 pre-1914	 sovereign	 debt	 market,	 these	institutions	not	only	determined	the	success	of	conditionality	and	fiscal	rules	in	reinforcing	 the	 credibility	 of	 debtor	 governments,	 but	 also	 they	 acted	 as	constraints	or	stimuli	in	terms	of	country	ownership	of	IFC	programme.		In	 this	 paper,	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 lending	conditionality	in	the	form	IFC	on	the	long-term	development	of	fiscal	capacity	of	debtor	 governments.	 Although	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 Egypt	 were	 able	 to	borrow	during	 this	period	on	a	 long-term	basis	with	very	 low	costs,	 there	was	limited	 accompanying	 transformation	 of	 political	 institutions	 and	 fiscal	centralisation.	It	can	be	argued	that	reinforced	credibility	combined	with	lack	of	developed	 political	 institutions	 slowed	 down	 the	 fiscal	 centralisation	 even	further,	as	the	governments	were	more	willing	to	choose	the	less	costly	path	of	borrowing.	On	the	other	hand,	in	Serbia	and	Greece,	IFC	operated	in	a	relatively	more	 developed	 fiscal	 and	 political	 institutional	 framework;	 hence	 the	governments	were	 less	willing	 to	cooperate	with	 foreign	creditors,	 resulting	 in	more	 costly	 borrowing.	 The	 high	 cost	 of	 borrowing,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	Greece,	 acted	 as	 a	 catalyst	 to	 reform	 the	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 institutions	 even	further	 and	 accelerated	 its	 move	 towards	 fiscal	 centralisation.	 Testing	 these	arguments	would	require	going	beyond	the	cases	of	this	paper.		
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8. Figures		 Figure	1	Bond	spreads:	1850s	to	1913	
	
Source:	Tuncer	(2015).	The	bonds	used	in	calculations	are	as	follows.	Greece:	5%	Independence	Loans	 of	 1879	 (Old	Greek	 loans	 converted),	 5%	 	 Loan	 of	 1881.	 Turkey:	 6%	Loan	 of	 1852	 and	1854,	 6%	 Loan	 of	 1858,	 6%	 Loan	 of	 1863–1864;	 6%	 Loan	 of	 1862,	 5%	 Priority	 Bonds,	 4%	Priority	 Loan	 (new	 issues	 in	 1890),	 4%	Loan	 of	 1891.	 Egypt:	 5%	preferred	 Loan	 of	 1877,	 7%	Loan	of	1862,	3.5%	preferred	Loan	of	1890.	Serbia:	5%	Loan	of	1881,	5%	Loan	of	1890,	4%	Loan	of	1895.	The	spread	is	expressed	as	percentage	points	is	the	difference	between	the	current	yield	of	 bonds	 and	 British	 consols.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Serbia,	 as	 the	 price	 quotes	 are	 from	 Paris,	 I	 used	French	rentes	to	calculate	bond	spreads.														
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		 Figure	2	Revenues	collected	by	IFCs	(in	millions	of	£):	1876-1913	
	
Source:	Tuncer	(2015)		 	
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9. Tables	
	Table	1	Summary	of	foreign	loans:	1854-1913	
 Number of 
foreign loans 
contracted 
Total nominal 
value of 
foreign loans 
(m£) 
Debt per 
capita (£) 
Average 
effective 
interest rate 
(%) 
Average 
yield (%) 
BEFORE 
IFC 
 
 
 
 
 
Egypt 9 69 7.2 8.5 8 
Ottoman 
Empire 18 219 8.9 8.6 8.6 
Serbia 17 16 6.2 6.7 6.2 
Greece 9 26 6.5 6.3 7.1 
  
  
 
 
AFTER 
IFC 
 
 
 
 
 
Egypt 10 55 7.5 4.5 5.4 
Ottoman 
Empire 23 90 6.2 4.7 4.7 
Serbia 7 25 9.1 5.1 5.4 
Greece 8 29 7.8 5 10.7 
Source: Tuncer (2015). Notes: The periods before IFC are 1862-76 for Egypt 1854-76 for the Ottoman 
Empire, 1879-1893 for Greece and 1881-94 for Serbia. The period after IFC is 1881-1913 for the 
Ottoman Empire, 1876-1913 for Egypt, 1898-1913 for Greece and 1895-1913 for Serbia. To eliminate 
double counting I only account for new issues and exclude bond conversions. Population estimates are 
from Maddison averages of same periods. Bond yields are average values before and after IFC, starting 
with the first date of borrowing, excluding episodes of defaults and ending in December 1913.  
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 Table	2	IFCs	in	comparison:	the	administrative	structure	and	reforms	
 Egypt 
(Caisse) 
Ottoman Empire 
(Council) 
Serbia 
(Administration) 
Greece 
(Commission) 
Period  1876-1914 1882-1914 1895-1914 1898-1914 
Managing 
council 
Bondholder Bondholder Bondholder/gover
nment 
Diplomatic 
Composition 
of the 
management 
Germany, Great 
Britain, Austria-
Hungary, Russia, 
France and Italy 
Britain, France, 
Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy 
and Austria-
Hungary 
bondholders, and a 
representative of 
the Ottoman 
government. 
France and 
Germany 
bondholders, 
director and four 
representatives of 
Serbian 
government. 
Diplomatic 
representatives of 
Austria-Hungary, 
France, Germany, 
Great Britain, 
Italy and Russia  
Revenue 
administration 
Direct collection 
and legislative 
power  
Direct collection Supervision and 
direct collection 
Supervision  
Acting as a 
trustee  
Yes Yes Yes No 
Monetary 
reform 
Extensive Limited Limited Extensive 
Resistance Contraband/armed Contraband/armed Political Political 
Source: Tuncer (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 	
